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Abstract
In general terms, e-government can be defined as the use of information and
communication technologies in government settings. However, it is neither a
homogeneous nor a static phenomenon. In recent years, empirical studies have
identified two interesting dynamics in e-government evolution. First, e-government
has evolved from its initial presence on the Internet to a more transactional and
integrated approach. Second, at the aggregate level and as a general trend, national
governments have started adding technological sophistication and have been followed
by state and local governments. This paper attempts to explain these two dynamics in
the evolution of e-government as a result of pressures from the administrative
apparatus of government and from the expectations of stakeholders involved in the
policy process such as citizens, politicians, and businesses. Both forces promote
change in the system of rules governing the design, implementation, and use of egovernment initiatives. Some policy implications are provided at the end of the paper.

I. Introduction
Governments are increasingly using information and communication technologies in their daily
business. As a consequence, the study of e-government has increased in recent years and several
theoretical approaches to understand e-government and conduct digital government research
have been developed (Gil-García and Luna-Reyes 2003; Schelin 2003). One of these approaches
to e-government understanding describes the evolution of e-government initiatives in terms of
their degree of technological and organizational sophistication (Moon 2002; Gil-García and
Luna-Reyes 2003; Schelin 2003). Within this evolutionary approach, several studies have been
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developed, but their scope is mainly descriptive. In order to explain how and why this evolution
has taken place, more analytical research and sound theoretical frameworks are needed. This
paper proposes a theory of e-government evolution as a result of important dynamics found in
the way in which systems of rules interact with action in organizational settings. This theoretical
framework poses a link between how public managers decide on e-government initiatives and
how citizens and other stakeholders involved in the policy process internalize those decisions
and subsequently influence them over time.
In the context of e-government evolution, we use institutional theory and the study of
rules as sources of change (Feldman 2000) to reframe the well-established politics-andadministration dilemma (Wilson 1887). Our theory explains that, at the aggregate level, egovernment has been adding more technological and organizational sophistication as a result of
both institutional isomorphism and pressures from citizens, politicians, businesses, interest
groups, and other stakeholders. In addition, e-government initiatives are evolving from the
national to the local level. If local governments are more sensitive to citizens’ needs as
devolution scholars argue, the situation described above may imply a change from self-imposed
initiatives searching for solutions (administration-performance), to externally imposed
requirements by citizens, their representatives, and other stakeholders (politics-accountability).
This paper is organized in seven sections including these introductory comments. Section
two describes two dynamics of e-government evolution. First, there is a constant addition of
technological sophistication, interaction capabilities, and business rules. This dynamic has been
framed as e-government stages from presence to transaction to integration. Second, the evolution
according to these stages has not been equal at all levels of government. In fact, there seems to
be a trend from the national level to state and local governments. Section three introduces basic
concepts about the study of rules and rule evolution. In section four, it is shown how systems of
rules can be designed mainly to address problems (performance) or to exercise control
(accountability). These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive and all rule systems represent
certain degree of both solution-guiding and behavior-constraining dimensions.
Section five integrates the bi-dimensional framework to systems of rules with some of the
complexities of government settings. Specifically, this section addresses the issue of multiple
stakeholders, and therefore, multiple designers of rule systems in the public sector. It also
provides some examples of how this work for e-government initiatives. In section six, the old
politics and administration dilemma is revisited and framed in terms of performance,

accountability, and the bi-dimensional framework to systems of rules. This framing is
exemplified by analyzing the second dynamic of e-government evolution and hypothesizing
some potential implications. Finally, section seven discusses other practical implications of the
theoretical model and suggests avenues for future research.
II. E-Government Evolution
In order to understand how systems of rules affect the evolution of e-government, it is necessary
first to comprehend the way in which scholars have characterized e-government evolution (Hiller
and Bélanger 2001; Layne and Lee 2001; UN and ASPA 2002). The evolutionary approach
examines e-government stages: from developing a web page to integrating government systems
behind the web interface. In this view, governments evolve from one stage to the other (Schelin
2003). Each of the stages represent different levels of technological sophistication, citizen
orientation, and administrative change (Moon 2002; Holden, Norris and Fletcher 2003). In
addition, some empirical studies have identified a dynamic progression in e-government
sophistication from national to state to local governments (Stowers 1999; Moon 2002; Edmiston
2003). Following, we briefly describe these two e-government dynamics.
E-Government Stages
This section presents a summary of different stage-models to e-government evolution (Hiller and
Bélanger 2001; Layne and Lee 2001; UN and ASPA 2002). It is important to clarify that in
reality these stages are not necessarily mutually exclusive or progressive (Moon 2002; Sandoval
and Gil-García 2005). In fact, specific e-governments initiatives may include characteristics
identified with several of the following stages. Therefore, this paper does not argue that the
stages are necessarily right, but recognizes that at the aggregate level technological
sophistication has been continuously added.
Initial Presence. This happens when a country, state, or local government has a formal
presence on the Internet through a limited number of individual governmental pages (mostly
developed by single governmental agencies). Governments in this stage normally offer static
information about agencies and some of the services they provide to citizens and private
organizations.

Extended Presence.

In this stage, governments provide more dynamic, specialized

information that is distributed and regularly updated in a great number of government sites.
Sometimes a national government’s official site serves as an entry point with links to pages of
other branches of government, ministries, secretariats, departments, and subnational
administrative bodies. Some governments might start using electronic mail or search engines to
interact with citizens, businesses and other stakeholders.
Interactive Presence. Governments use a statewide or national portal as the initial page
providing access to services in multiple agencies. The interaction between citizens and different
government agencies increases in this stage (e.g., e-mail, forums, etc.). Citizens and businesses
can access information according to their different interests. In some cases, passwords are used
to access more customized and secure services.
Transactional Presence. Citizens and businesses can personalize or customize a national
or statewide portal. This portal becomes a unique showcase of all the governmental services
available in the relevant area of interest. The needs of different constituencies are the main
criteria for portal design and access (government structure and functions are only secondary
criteria). The portal allows secure electronic payments to be made, facilitating transactions such
as tax, fines, and services payments.
Vertical Integration. This stage encompasses the integration of similar services provided
by different levels of government. This integration can be virtual, physical, or both. Therefore,
this stage does not refer solely to an incipient integration in the form of government websites, but
to the change and reconstruction of the processes and/or governmental structures.
Horizontal Integration. Layne and Lee (2001) argue that horizontal integration between
different governmental services must exist for citizens and other stakeholders to have access to
all the potential of information technologies in government. Therefore, in this stage governments
need to cross organizational boundaries and develop a comprehensive and integral vision of the
government as a whole. Vertical and horizontal integration do not necessarily happen together or
sequentially.
Totally Integrated Presence. This stage refers to the situation in which government
services are fully integrated (vertically and horizontally). Citizens have access to a variety of
services through a single portal, using a unique ID and password. All services can be accessed
from the same web page and can be paid in a consolidated bill. A transformation unseen by the

public has taken place, and now services are organized according to processes and
constituencies, not only virtually, but also physically. In this stage, governments undertake
institutional and administrative reforms that fully employ the potential of information
technologies (Grönlund 2001).
From National to Local E-Government
The descriptions above show how each of the stages represent the addition of several rules and
standards relating to what e-government activities are expected to be in a governmental
community. The stages are presented as the correct path to follow in order to develop a fully
integrated e-government initiative (Layne and Lee 2001). However, it is important to emphasize
that these stages vary among national contexts and levels of government. In fact, there seem to
be clear differences between national, state, and local governments.
Figure 1 shows hypothetical trends in e-government sophistication adoption at different
levels of government. The actual shape of the curves can be very different and does not have to
be linear, but the point of this figure is to show, graphically, what has been found in empirical
research. Studies have explicitly or implicitly identified a trend in the evolution of e-government
initiatives (at the aggregate level) that seems to go from national to state, and to local
governments (Stowers 1999; Moon 2002; Edmiston 2003; Holden et al. 2003). This is not
exclusive to the United States; in other countries with highly developed electronic government
initiatives at the national level such as New Zealand, many local governments are still in the very
initial stages of e-government (Cullen, O'Connor and Veritt 2003).
Generally, national governments have both financial resources and technical expertise to
be able to move constantly toward continuously more sophisticated stages of e-government.
Arguably, they also have the least direct democratic control from citizens, businesses, and other
stakeholders. However, state and local governments are also improving their e-government
initiatives. For instance Moon (2002) mentions that “following the federal initiative, many local
governments also adopted IT for local governance.” (p. 424). As mentioned earlier, egovernment adoption and sophistication is increasing fast, but as of 2000, “most local
governments had a presence on the Web and were at least at the beginning stages of egovernment development [but] few of them offered sophisticated on-line services involving
interactive transactions.” (Holden et al. 2003, p. 341).
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Figure 1— E-Gov Evolution (From National to Local)

As an example of this trend, in the United States of America there is a clear disparity
between federal, state, and local governments (Moon 2002; Edmiston 2003; Holden et al. 2003).
Many state and local governments are attempting to make the transition from the initial or
extended presence stages to the transactional stage. Some other local governments are still
cataloging information (Reddick 2004) or trying to establish their first web page for citizens and
business use. In a different context, some European countries, Canada, and the United States are
competing to have the most advanced e-government capabilities. It is important to clarify that
this trend does not refer to the government portal or main page only, but to the complete
government website including agency-specific and inter-agency websites. As a result of this
second dynamic, “e-government at the local level is still in its formative stages” (Holden et al.
2003). However, there are important exceptions to this trend such as G2B applications (Reddick
2004) and e-government websites in some large cities (Ho 2002). These exceptions highlight
how specific contexts and the capabilities and resources of certain stakeholders (e.g., business)
can influence e-government evolution.
The two e-government dynamics described in this section are not mutually exclusive and
normally work in a complex interplay. The following hypothetical situation can help to
understand some of the mechanisms of both evolutionary dynamics. In the Nation of Utopia,
some national-level government agencies start including more transactions on their websites
generating two different dynamics. First, other government agencies at the same national level,

either from the same country or from other countries, decide to include more services and
sophisticated features as a case of emergent institutional isomorphism (La Porte, Demchak and
Friis 2001). The fact that more agencies are providing transactional services creates pressure on
other governmental agencies to follow the same path (at the national level and the state and local
levels). Second, once government agencies at different levels (e.g., federal, state, and local) are
providing transactional services through their websites, citizens from other governments realize
this can be useful and start demanding e-government transactional services to their own
politicians and public managers (Curtin, Sommer and Vis-Sommer 2003).
III. The Study of Rules
Organizational action is established around rules which fit together to create and maintain the
systems organizations use to grow and evolve (Vanberg 1994). Because “rules and resources
mediate human action while at the same time they are reaffirmed through being used by human
actors” (Orlikowski 1992, p. 404), studying both rule systems and the behavior of the actors in
those systems is important.
Scholars in the social sciences have recognized that rules enable action in organizations
and everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Ganz 1971; Hayes 1989). Possibly, there is no
action—including e-government activity—that is not related to rules, either written or unwritten
(Schauer 1991). However, despite the powerful role rule formation and its dynamics play, they
have been studied only rarely (for examples see March, Schulz and Zhou 2000; and MartinezMoyano 2004).
Actions
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Figure 2—Cycle of rule evolution (adapted from March et al. 2000)

As portrayed in Figure 2, rules influence action through a process of implementation.
Over time, and through interpretation mechanisms, the results of actions are translated into a
history that determines what an effective and useful practice in organizations is. Understanding
the interpretation mechanisms is essential to comprehending the lessons that are formalized as
history. In the interpretation process, there can be several biases and misidentification problems
(for a review see Kleindorfer, Kunreuther and Shoemaker 1993). The way action becomes
history is a social process in which knowledge is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann
1966) and, in some cases, has little or nothing to do with logic and evidence.
Once a set of insights has been recorded as history, an adaptation process transforms the
lessons of history into rules. The accumulation of rules creates a rule repertoire in the
organization, closing the evolutionary cycle of rule formation and change. Organizational rule
systems then become organizational repositories of lessons from history: organizational memory
in action. The problem of using organizational memory in the future still exists though. The fact
that organizations are capable, through learning, of accumulating knowledge about how to deal
with the challenges of their environments does not ensure that this information will be used
adequately, or at all. Rule-following preferences of individuals and norms for rule compliance in
organizations, can act as enablers of the inherent power of the rule systems. A very powerful rule
system that is not adequately used and followed will be inefficient, just as a fully followed, but
weak, rule system. Compliance dynamics play a key role in understanding the observed
capabilities of systems in organizations (Martinez-Moyano, McCaffrey and Oliva 2005).
A viable theory that includes the notions of rules and evolution requires, at the least, a
definition of what a rule is that will enable the individuals to examine the existence, change, and
reproduction of rules and systems of rules as general, ongoing, and historically embedded
mechanisms in organizations. Referring to rules, Giddens (1984, p. 21, 377) proposes the notions
of ‘structure’ and ‘rules.’ Sewell (1992, p. 8, 27) advances ideas of ‘structure’ and ‘schema,’
while Bourdieu (1977) suggests the notion of ‘structure’ and ‘habitus.’ Meyer and Rowan (1977)
identify rules as ‘formal structure’ and ‘myth and ceremony,’ and Barley and Tolbert (1997, p.
96) link rules with their definition of ‘institutionalization’ and ‘institutions.’ Synthesizing notions
from the literature, we define rules as ‘probabilistic generalizations of behavior’ and systems of
rules as ‘the set of written organizational codes—herein called rules—and unwritten
organizational norms—herein called norms—that conditions action in organizations.’

IV. Goals in Systems of Rules
Why do rule systems change over time? Part of the answer to this question seems to be related to
the different concerns designers of systems of rules have about rule systems and their goals
(Zhou 1993), because the goal of the rule system determines its structure over time. Goals in
systems of rules can be conceptualized using two different approaches (Martinez-Moyano and
Gil-Garcia 2004). Rules and rule systems can be designed primarily as behavior-constraining
mechanisms (OReilly and Chatman 1996; Feldman 2000; Feldman 2002), or they can principally
be thought of as solution-guiding mechanisms (Burt, Gabbay, Holt and Moran 1994; Roberts and
Dowling 2002). This distinction is introduced as a way to organize and understand better the
different concerns identified in the literature. We know that every time that a rule is issued, the
rule maker can have both purposes in mind, constraining behavior and generating a solution to a
problem.
Identifying rules and systems of rules as solution-guiding artifacts focuses the attention
on how well the system of rules ‘embodies’ the set of solutions to the problems and opportunities
the organization faces at any given time. Presumably, changes in the systems of rules are guided
by the adequacy of the current set of rules with respect to the current set of recognized problems
and opportunities the organization faces (the main driver is related to performance
enhancement). Alternatively, the behavior-constraining approach to systems of rules is more
concerned with the adequacy of the systems of rules to generate a predetermined, or expected,
behavioral response from both individuals and organizations (driver focused on accountability
concerns).
Systems of Rules as Behavior-Constraining Mechanisms
Systems of rules in organizations can be conceptualized as means for control (Hayek 1945;
Schauer 1991; Hauser 1995). Researchers have found empirical evidence of this. For example,
O’Reilly and Chatman’s (1996) work looks at control systems based on shared norms and values
that influence members’ focus of attention and interpretation of events, and guide their attitude
and behavior. In addition, investigating organizational routines, Feldman (2000) identified great
potential for change in the way organizations carry out supposedly invariant lines of action
embodied in organizational routines. Feldman (2000; 2002) emphasizes the behavior-

constraining characteristics of the system of rules embodied in organizational routines by
reporting that change in organizational routines comes from the internal dynamics of the
routines, connections between citizens, understanding about what needs to be done, and from
thoughts and behavioral reactions of individuals participating in the routines. She says, “people
will tend to breathe life into the routines they engage in because of the relationship between their
behavior and their plans and ideals” (Feldman 2000, p. 627).
The introduction of a new rule as a behavior-constraining mechanism was found in a
federally-funded training on the job program: the Job Training Partnership Act—JTAP—of
1982. JTPA created one of the largest federal employment and training programs in the country
(Courty and Marschke 2003). The JTPA replaced its precursor Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act—CETA—as the major job-training program for the poor (Cragg 1995). Its main
innovation over the previous program in place—CETA—was the use of a performancecontingent incentive system. JTPA had a budget of nearly $4.0 billion dollars and served a
constituency of almost one million people annually. JTPA’s mission has been defined as to
“raise the earnings ability and lower the welfare dependency of the poor.” (Courty and Marschke
2003, p. 275) Alternatively, it has been identified as to increase the long-term human capital of
program enrollees. JTPA’s mission, in other words, was to help the economically disadvantaged
do better in the long run via improving their skills and capacity to become employed and be selfsufficient, a very noble mission indeed .
Congress intended JTPA activities to influence participants’ human capital by helping
participants become more capable and efficient workers by means of training. In order to provide
incentives for the service providers to align their efforts with the intended results, performance
measurement changed over time. Performance measurement in JTPA changed from cost-based
performance measurement, to termination-based performance measurement, to follow-upindicators-based performance measurement. Under these mechanisms, the service agency
graduates enrollees as part of their normal process. An enrollee that has finalized the training,
under ideal circumstances, would be graduated and reported to the state. However, that was not
the case always. For example, in some cases, training agencies reported graduation dates
differently than the actual dates in which the enrollees finished training causing interesting
dynamics derived of these behaviors.

The first significant rule change under JTPA was the introduction of ‘the 90-day’ rule.
This rule was introduced as a behavior-constraining mechanism to force the providers of services
to behave in a certain way. After CETA was replaced by JTPA in 1982, performance
measurement of the providers of services was conducted in the exact same way as during CETA.
Under the original rule, the providers of services were compensated according to a metric called
‘employment rate at termination’ that measured the job success of the trainees at moment of
termination from the training program. Under this regime, the higher the employment rate at
termination (ERT), the better. Managers in training agencies were given latitude on when to
terminate enrollees. Managers would terminate individuals only if they had jobs, not before. This
created incredible high ERTs. This continued until the department of labor recognized that it had
been determined “by monitors and auditors” that managers in training centers had allowed “some
participants continued to be carried in an ‘active’ or ‘inactive’ status for two or three years after
last contact” (US_Department_of_Labor 1993, p. 4) with their training programs. Their way to
constrain the behavior of the providers was with the creation and implementation of a new rule:
the 90-day rule. With the inclusion of the 90-day rule, the DOL required training agencies to
measure performance using the ERT measure but also required agencies to terminate individuals
that had not received any services after a maximum of 90 days. The new rule, the 90-day rule,
was designed to provide agencies “some latitude in securing jobs for their customers”
(US_Department_of_Labor 1997, p. 1) [and improving their performance measure], and at the
same time avoiding the possibility of hiding bad performance by not terminating unsuccessful
candidates.
After the introduction of the 90-Day-Rule Regime, “another important change in the
measurement system was to move to ‘follow-up’ measures.” (Courty and Marschke 2003, p.
279). The introduction of the follow-up-rule regime became, in JTPA, the way to solve different
problems identified over time in JTPA-related provision of training services. The follow-up-rule
regime was the response of JTPA officials to the problems identified after the introduction of the
90-day rule regime. The most important problem identified was the possibility of influencing the
performance measure by means that were not aligned with the ‘true spirit’ of the program. JTPA
officials identified, at least, three mechanisms that providers of services decided to use after the
implementation of the 90-day rule regime to influence their performance outcomes: introduction

of post-training actions, strategic termination of enrollees, and cream skimming (for details of
the mechanisms see Martinez-Moyano 2004)
Systems of Rules as Solution-Guiding Mechanisms
The solution-guiding approach to systems of rules is mainly concerned with the way in which
systems of rules represent a solution—or match—to the problems managers are able to identify
and consider important. Additionally, it represents the concern to create organizational solutions
for the simplification of the decisional process. According to the solution-guiding view, the more
rules individuals in organizations can use, the simpler their decision process will be. Rules
become solutions to problems.
Researchers such as Burt, Gabbay, Holt, and Moran (1994) have identified a clear link
between the value of a system of rules in an organization and the type of market the organization
is in. According to these researchers, a strong corporate set of guidelines is a valuable asset in
competitive markets and can be almost worthless in non-competitive environments. Additionally,
Roberts and Dowling (2002), who have investigated the link between corporate reputation and
sustained superior financial performance, report that “good reputation is difficult, if not
impossible, to replicate in the short term” (p. 1079). This is because it is linked to tangible assets
such as previous financial results and to intangible assets such as the organizational way of doing
what they do—procedures, rules, and routines. Roberts and Dowling (2002) explicitly compare
their findings with those of Sorensen’s study (2002) that investigated the relationship between
the strength of corporate culture and organizational performance.
Roberts and Dowlings’ (2002) study and Sorensen’s (2002) study stress the capacity of
systems of rules to be solution-guiding mechanisms over time; part of their findings is that this
capacity declines as time goes on, implying that the rate of change of the system of rules does
not match the rate of change of the environment.
Other researchers, such as Ensminger and Knight (1997), stress the idea of sets of rules as
solution-guiding mechanisms in their investigation of norms. They say, “in some cases they
[members of the society] will create norms consciously; in other cases the norms will emerge as
unintended consequences of the pursuit of strategic advantage. In each case the focus is on the
substantive outcome; the development of the norm is merely a means to that end” (Ensminger

and Knight 1997, p.5). The rules are there to provide strategic advantage and to improve the
chances of generating appropriate outcomes.
Researchers in evolutionary economics have recognized the significance of
organizational rules, particularly in relation to changes in technological production (Massini,
Lewin, Numagami and Pettigrew 2002). Massini, Lewin, Numagami, and Pettigrew (2002)
investigated the evolution of organizational routines from an evolutionary perspective, exploring
adoption and adaptation of new structural and procedural organizational routines and emerging
dominant managerial practices in large European, Japanese, and US firms between 1992 and
1996. They reported that, “procedures relate to the rules and routines underlying the firm’s
execution of activities’’ (Massini et al. 2002, p. 1334), and that they relate to changes firms make
in competitive environments that influence the level of organizations’ performance.
One of the findings of the study by Massini, Lewin, Numagami, and Pettigrew (2002, p.
1335) is that “from an evolutionary perspective, organizational differences are grounded in the
ability to generate and internalize innovations, rather than in the possession of certain
technologies” speaking to the power of systems of rules as solution-guiding mechanisms in
organizations. The greater an organization’s ability to internalize changes in their systems of
rules, the greater the probability it will exhibit ‘successful’ results over time.
For example, a new rule as a solution-guiding mechanism arose when in 2003, in an epicmaking action, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced enforcement actions against
ten Wall Street firms and two individual analysts arising from an investigation of research
analyst conflict of interest (SEC 2003; SEC 2004) totaling $1.4 billion. The settlements were
reached with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the New York Attorney
General (NYAG), and other state regulators. The firms accepted that they had encouraged their
investment analysts to publicly exaggerate corporations’ investment value, misleading investors,
in order to win the corporations’ investment banking business. Martinez-Moyano, McCaffrey,
and Oliva (2005, p. 10) report email exchanges between analysts and institutional investors about
excessively favorable rating for firms conveying the situation.
An institutional investor and an analyst discussed the effect of the conflict of
interest on the analyst’s research in the following exchange:

Institutional Investor: I understand – business is business. But I feel bad for those
naïve investors who assume that sell-side analysts are objective! I wish some
buy-side institutions would get together to establish an independent equity
research consortium with analysts paid for on a subscription basis or something…
Analyst: well, ratings and price targets are fairly meaningless anyway, buy-side
[large investors] generally ignores, commentary is what matters and I’ll be a
[more negative about the company]…in my comments . . . but, yes, the “little
guy” who isn’t smart about the nuances may get misled, such is the nature of my
business (NYSE 2003, p. 15).
The net result of the settlements included the introduction of the new rule in which
investment baking and research were to be managed as two independent entities within in the
firms. This rule presented a solution to the problem identified. Solutions like this may or may not
include explicit constraints to individual or organizational behavior.
Systems of Rules as Bidimensional Mechanisms
Designers of systems of rules in organizations might have a set of preferences and skills that will
allow them to design systems of rules that will have a combination of the two goals just
discussed (see Figure 3). The combinations create four quadrants of possible types of rules and
of systems of rules, according to the main goal of the system’s designer.
High
Solution Guiding

IV

I
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Behavior Constraining

High
Behavior Constraining

III
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Figure 3—Goals in systems of rules

Quadrant I—high on the solution concern and high on the behavior concern—represents
systems of rules created to solve the problems the organization faces via constraining individual
behavior. This would be the case in which the problem that the organization experiences is
derived mainly from the behavior of certain individuals. For example, in the wake of the terrorist
attacks on the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration determined that the solution (at

lest partially) to the problem of having weapons inside air carriers was to constrain the range of
behaviors that the passengers could adopt. Specifically, what types of things could be carried on
board. The FAA changed the rules of carry-on items and those related to personal searches
limiting the behavior of passengers and ‘solving’ the problem.
Alternatively, quadrant II—high on the behavior control concern and low on the solution
concern—represents systems of rules designed primarily to constrain behavior, even when that is
not necessarily aligned with the solutions needed to the current problems the organization is
facing. In this case, the designer of the system of rules is more concerned with the internal
dynamics than the external ones. This approach—a housekeeping approach—is widely used due
to the illusion of being in control of the organizations’ destiny. It is always easier to try to control
the internal environment than the external. For example, a typical response to growing levels of
absenteeism or accidents in organizations is to increase the reporting required to document this
phenomenon. The more accidents or people absent, the more reports produced. This response
creates an illusion of being in control by constraining the range of behaviors (with respect to
reporting) that individuals can engage in. However, it has very little effect (if any) on solving the
associated problem.
Quadrant III—low on both dimensions—represent rules that have no real impact on the
organization, these could be considered some sort of irrelevant rules. For example, in the case of
Federal initiatives for training on the job, critical variables to measure performance of service
providers changed when the original program (Job Training Partnership Act –JTPA) changed to
become the Workforce Investment Act (WIA)3. Under JTPA, the variables used were the
Employment Rate at Termination (ERT), the Welfare Employment Rate at Termination
(WERT), the Average Wage at Termination (AWT), the Cost per Employment (CE), the
Employment Rate at Follow-up (ERF), the Welfare Employment Rate at Follow-up (WERF), the
Average Weekly Earnings at Follow-up

(AWEF), and the Average Weeks Worked by

Follow-up (AWWF). Under WIA, the measures changed to the Entered Employment Rate
(EER), the Employment Retention Rate (ERR), the Earnings Change in Six Months (ECSM),
and the Employment and Credential Rate (ECR). However, independently of the number of
measures used, the main driver of performance assessment remained the same, the employment
rate of the graduates of the training programs (ERT & EER). In this case, changing the definition
3

See Appendix 1 for a description of the measures used in the programs.

of the measures used was of little consequence in terms of behavior of the providers of services
and in terms of solving the problems of the program.
Lastly, quadrant IV—high on the solution guiding and low on the behavior
constraining—represent rules that are truly seeking to resolve the challenges that the
organization is facing assuming that the individuals in it are capable and will follow the rules.
For example, in the case of the financial markets regulation, prominent failures and scandals
overrode reservations about the effect of new legislation on the markets and produced major
securities laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July of 2002 (Seligman 2003). Part of the
changes introduced in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) contemplates the introduction of new rules
that promotes enhanced financial disclosures (Title IV) and auditor independence (Title II).
These change were designed to provide a clear solution to lack of communication prevalent in
the market and to the normalization of deviance problem (Vaughan 1996; Vaughan 1998;
Vaughan 1999) generated over time.
In general, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) introduced changes that could be identified in
the solution-guiding area and in the behavior-constraining area. This is true of most systems of
rules due to the multiplicity of rules contained in them. However, at the level of specific rules, it
is possible to distinguish better the specific type of rules using the distinctions presented in this
section.
An assumption of this model is that the designer of the system of rules is a single actor
who can unilaterally decide the components of the system of rules and its overall orientation—
solutions vs. behavior constraining. This assumption may be valid only for private-sector
organizations, especially small ones. In private sector organizations the decision making process
tends to be more centralized than in public sector organizations. Additionally, in the private
sector in general, the operations are not carried out in a participatory manner. However, in the
public sector, and for large organizations, the single-designer assumption might be difficult to
sustain due to the complexity of the decision-making processes, and the necessary degree of
participation due to the existence of multiple stakeholders with multiple and often conflicting
views and goals. Additionally, in the public sector exist institutionalized checks and balances
systems (Wilson 1887; Waldo 1980; Rosenbloom 1983; Riccucci 2001) that make it difficult for
a single individual or organization to decide and define changes to the systems of rules. This
situation makes the single-designer assumption hard to sustain in governmental contexts.

V. Multiple Designers and Systems of Rules in the Public Sector
The single-designer assumption in the construction of solutions must be relaxed to incorporate
the characteristics public managers have to consider in e-government initiatives. E-government
initiatives can be characterized in general as solutions to problems identified by public managers.
The problems identified might vary from unclear, ill-defined issues that will be solved by egovernment action, to very clearly defined requirements requested of the government by citizens,
politicians, interest groups, among others (the principals). Problems can also range from
relatively clear technical problems to complex political, economic, or social considerations.
High
Solution Guiding
Low
Behavior Constraining

High
Behavior Constraining

Figure 4—Citizens’ view (including other stakeholders)

Frequently, a solution via e-government is often devised first by public managers and
then, if certain conditions are met, it becomes a requirement that must be fulfilled in order to be
evaluated as ‘doing the right thing.’ In the public sector, particularly in the case of e-government
initiatives, at least two parties will be involved in the system design: public managers as
suppliers, and citizens, businesses, and other stakeholders as demanders. This characteristic
transforms the goal-definition problem in the design of systems of rules from a single-designer
problem to a multi-designer problem. In general, citizens are able to ‘see’ the problem across
only one dimension: the behavior-constraint dimension. Citizens and other stakeholders are
concerned with how public managers are doing their jobs and how they comply with the
requirements set for them (accountability). Citizens expect that public managers have the ability
and technical expertise to provide high-level solutions to the problems identified. Therefore, as
presented in Figure 4, the most important dimension for citizens and other stakeholders is the
control dimension.
In the case of public managers, e-government initiatives concentrate mainly on the
solution-guiding dimension (see Figure 5). The ideal operating scenario for public managers is to
be able to concentrate exclusively on how good their initiatives are with respect to the problems
they are facing (performance). Public managers seek having enough discretion to be able to

design and implement the solution that best addresses the problem at hand (flexibility). This case
implies a low behavior-constraint emphasis on the part of the citizens and other stakeholders.
Moon and Welch (2004) explain that “the bureaucrat’s enthusiasm for swifter implementation of
e-government appears to be fueled by strong confidence in the capacity of government to
securely provide services and respond to citizen needs.” (p. 8)
High
Solution Guiding

Low
Behavior Constraining

Low
Solution Guiding

Figure 5—Public managers’ View

The ideal scenario would be the one in which public managers are capable of doing
exactly what they think they should be doing with respect to one specific problem (high solutionguiding concern), while the citizens they serve evaluate that precise activity as a requirement that
the public managers should be fulfilling (high behavior-constraining concern). The likelihood of
this being the case is very low. However, this idealized exploration enables us to identify the
power of a shared vision—in the sense that Senge (1990) describes—on what the e-government
activities should be. If there is an alignment (natural or created) between what the public
managers want to do and what the citizens and other stakeholders consider is required, the two
constituencies would be operating at the height of their own relevant dimensions with respect to
the design of the system of government activities—e-government in particular.
VI. E-Government Evolution: Reframing the Politics and Administration Dilemma
If the view that government is closer to citizens at the local level is true, then the degree of
responsiveness and accountability will be greater in local governments. The capacity of citizens
and other stakeholders to control public managers increases from the national, to the state, to the
local level (see Figure 6). For instance, scholars interested in topics such as devolution or
decentralization have identified that state and local governments are more sensitive to citizen’s
needs and potentially also more accountable to them (Gore 1996; Nathan 1996; Thompson and

Riccucci 1998). Thus, the system of rules that governs the development of e-government
initiatives moves from a self-imposed, solution-oriented goal (at national level), to a behaviorcontrol-oriented goal (at local level).

B

Citizens
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(Control)

Public Managers
Solution Oriented
(Self-imposed)

A
National
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Figure 6—Evolution of e-government initiatives

This argument suggests that e-government initiatives may evolve from national to local
levels of government, and that decision-making power would simultaneously shift from public
managers to citizens and other stakeholders. As the reader can observe, this dimension between
problem-solution-oriented and behavior-control-oriented goals can be equated to the wellestablished politics and administration dilemma (Wilson 1887). Initially e-government initiatives
are greatly shaped by public managers’ concerns (mainly at national level). After some time,
citizens and other stakeholders (directly or through their representatives) gain more control over
what e-government is, or should be; in other words, what level of technological sophistication is
considered adequate, and what services they want. However, it is important to clarify that
citizens’ expectations, or e-government demand, may or may not have a direct effect on egovernment functionality but a more complex indirect influence (La Porte et al. 2001; Ho 2002;
Gil-García 2005).
The dynamics described above might not always generate ideal results. Using a
democratic lens, and assuming that citizens and other stakeholders have complete information
about the details of e-government initiatives and their actual results, the change in control seems
very positive. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes citizens demand a greater level of
services and technological sophistication only because that is what they observe in other
contexts, not because they actually need it. Therefore, this approach enables an understanding of
the positive and negative impacts of e-government initiatives, even if citizens and other

stakeholders (as principals of public managers) have certain level of control. In fact, due to an
information asymmetry problem, public managers will have discretionary spaces to re-interpret
and modify some of the demands of citizens, businesses, politicians, and other stakeholders.
VII. Final Comments
This paper explored the interaction between the way e-government evolves over time and the
way in which the systems of rules that influence e-government action change. We used
institutional theory and the study of rules to reframe the well-established politics and
administration dilemma in our model. Additionally, we have characterized the design problem in
systems of rules as mainly a single-designer situation in the private sector and as a multidesigner situation in the public sector. In the latter case, actors involved have different interests
along different dimensions that make coordination more difficult than in the first case. It seems
that, in the case of public-sector action, in general, and in e-government activity, in particular,
the development of a shared vision between public managers and their constituencies of the
initiatives to be accomplished could be key for a successful outcome across dimensions and
expectations. Part of what is needed to create a useful shared vision is the development of clear
dynamic indicators for the evaluation of e-government initiatives. Researchers argue that today,
metrics used to asses e-government initiatives are “designed to measure the static nature of egovernment performance mainly based on web content analysis” (Moon, Welch and Wong 2005,

Extent of Use

p. 10) not capturing adequately the dynamic nature of their actions and interactions.
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Figure 7—Extent of use of e-government initiatives

We argue that, in the case of e-government initiatives, public managers are in charge for
a period of time in which they develop and test initiatives to assess their efficiency and

effectiveness. However, after the extent—the combination of frequency and importance—of use
of those initiatives reach a critical point (point y in Figure 7)—herein called tipping point (for an
extended treatment of the subject see Sterman 2000)—the control of the initiative changes to the
citizens and other stakeholders by declaring the existence of the initiative as a requirement for
‘normal’ operation.
This insight has potential implications in the way in which new initiatives are to be
designed and tested (by bureaucrats) in order to maintain their control and be able to contain its
use and growth. Furthermore, it has been argued that setting the pace for implementation of egovernment in a democratic environment “requires the understanding of the different mental
models according to which citizens, bureaucrats and politicians operate.” (Moon and Welch
2004, p. 9) According to this rationale, public managers might be better off when, and if, they
identify where the tipping point is to determine if they want the e-government initiative to
behave like the ‘A’ curve in Figure 7, or in a more constrained fashion like curve ‘B’, or if
needed, terminate the initiative (curve ‘C’). In order to find the said tipping point, public
managers can rely on longitudinal studies of relevant characteristics of e-government action—
like sources of funding and requirements—and, additionally, in the use of dynamic modeling
techniques (Richardson and Pugh 1981; Sterman 2000). In general, public managers might be
able to maintain control of the e-government initiative from point ‘0’ in the extent of use scale to
point ‘x’; beyond that point, citizens and other stakeholders will control the initiative via
establishing requirements—explicit or implicit—of e-government operation and using those
systems. Simultaneously, “as with all other types of significant managerial activities by public
organizations, [e-government] success will be determined by the ability of public servants to
understand and address the desires and concerns of the governing citizens and to communicate
informed decisions to the same individuals as governed citizens.” (Moon and Welch 2004, p. 9)
One example should serve to clarify how this can work for specific e-government
initiatives. First, a new application for online driver’s license renewal is developed. For some
time, citizens and other stakeholders start using the application at a very low pace (beginning of
the curve). During that initial period and until certain extent of use (represented by x), public
managers can evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the new application and make decisions about
modifications or even terminating the program (which would lead to a curve like C in figure 6).
Once many stakeholders are using the application, or relatively few stakeholders are using the
application very intensively (extent of use), which is represented as the curve after point y,

terminating the program would be a very difficult option. By then, citizens, businesses, and other
stakeholders will be knowledgeable about the benefits of the online driver’s license renewal
application and they will expect to continue being able to use it. Therefore, even if the
application is not cost-effective or have other major problems, it would be very difficult for
public mangers to abandon the initiative. At that point, only curves A and B are potential
alternatives. For example, if they want to increase the use of the online application in a major
way, they can use an aggressive marketing campaign to communicate effectively with the
citizens as Moon and Welch (2004) suggest to do to ensure success in e-government
implementation processes. If this campaign and other actions are successful, then the initiative
may look like curve A. The evolution of a good online application without other managerial
support (e.g., marketing) may look like curve B. Public managers should be aware of all this
complexity and develop strategies according to their different options (including terminating the
initiative) and the goals of the e-government applications.
According to the theory presented in this paper, e-government is evolving toward more
sophisticated and complex standards due to several mechanisms. Simultaneously, public
managers looking for solutions to their interests, and citizens and other stakeholders looking for
better services and accountability mechanisms will produce continuous pressures for the
evolution of e-government definition and requirements. Thus, this paper provides a useful
theoretical model to understand the evolution of e-government and to identify some of the
feedback mechanisms that create that evolutionary pattern. One question that remains is how to
create e-government policies and standards that can be both solutions to what public managers
consider problems and, at the same time, be responsive to citizens’ actual needs. This paper
proposes the desirability of a system of rules and standards for e-government initiatives that can
accomplish both goals: solution guidance and behavior control. A truly useful e-government
model should foster the alignment between these two dimensions that can be translated into
effective and responsive e-government action.

Appendix 1
Table 1— Federal JTPA Performance Measures in Effect in Years 1987-1989 (Courty and Marschke 2004)
Performance Measure

Definition
Adult Performance Measures

Employment Rate at Termination

ERT

Fraction of terminees employed at termination

Welfare Employment Rate at Termination

WERT

Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at termination

Average Wage at Termination

AWT

Average wage at termination for terminees who were employed at termination

Cost per Employment

CE

Training center’s year’s expenditures on adults divided by the number of adults employed at
termination

Employment Rate at Follow-up

ERF

Fraction of terminees who were employed at 13 weeks after termination

Welfare Employment Rate at Follow-up

WERF

Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 13 weeks after
termination

Average Weekly Earnings at Follow-up

AWEF

Average weekly wage of terminees who were employed 13 weeks after termination

Average Weeks Worked by Follow-up

AWWF

Average number of weeks worked by terminees in 13 weeks following termination
Youth Performance Measures

Youth Employment Rate at Termination

YERT

Fraction of youth terminees employed at termination

Youth Employability Enhancement Rate

YEEN

Fraction of youth terminees who obtained employment competencies (see note 3 below)

Youth Positive Termination Rate

YPTR

Fraction of youth terminees who were “positively terminated” (see note 3 below)

Youth Cost per Employment

YCE

Training center’s year’s expenditures on youths divided by the number of youths positively
terminated

Notes:
1.
2.
3.

The data of termination is the date the enrollee officially exits training. A terminee is an enrollee after he has officially exited training.
All measures are calculated over the year’s terminee population. Therefore, the average follow-up weekly earnings for 1987 was calculated using earnings at follow-up for the
terminees who terminated in 1987, even if their follow-up period extended into 1988. Likewise, persons who terminated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 measure, even if
their follow-up period extended into 1987.
A positive termination is entering un-subsidized employment, attaining youth employment “competencies” (through course-work, training and/or tests in work maturity, basic
education, or job-specific skills), entering non-JTPA training, returning to school full-time, or completing a major level of education.

Table 2— Federal WIA Core Performance Measures in Effect in Years 2000-2004 (US_Department_of_Labor 2004)
Performance Measure

Definition
Adult Performance Measures

Entered Employment Rate

EER

# of adults who have entered employment by the end of the 1st quarter (Qtr.) after exit / # of adults
who exit during the quarter

Employment Retention Rate

ERR

# of adults who are employed in 3rd Qtr. after exit / # of adults who exit during the quarter

Earnings Change in Six Months

ECSM

[Total Post-Program Earnings (earnings in Qtr 2 + Qtr 3 after exit)] - [Pre-Program Earnings
(earnings in Qtrs 2 + 3 prior to registration)] / # of adults who exit during the quarter

Employment and Credential Rate

ECR

# of adults who were employed in the 1st Qtr. after exit and received a credential by the end of 3rd
quarter after exit / # of adults who exited services during the quarter
Customer Satisfaction Measures

Participant Customer Satisfaction

PCS

The weighted average of participant ratings on each of 3 questions regarding overall satisfaction
with services received. This score is reported on a 0-100 scale

Employer Customer Satisfaction

ECS

The weighted average of employer ratings on each of 3 questions regarding overall satisfaction with
services received. This score is reported on a 0-100 scale.
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